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Abstract. We present, for the ﬁrst time, a general strategy for designing
ARX symmetric-key primitives with provable resistance against single-
trail diﬀerential and linear cryptanalysis. The latter has been a long
standing open problem in the area of ARX design. The wide trail de-
sign strategy (WTS), that is at the basis of many S-box based ciphers,
including the AES, is not suitable for ARX designs due to the lack of
S-boxes in the latter. In this paper we address the mentioned limitation
by proposing the long trail design strategy (LTS) – a dual of the WTS
that is applicable (but not limited) to ARX constructions. In contrast
to the WTS, that prescribes the use of small and eﬃcient S-boxes at the
expense of heavy linear layers with strong mixing properties, the LTS
advocates the use of large (ARX-based) S-Boxes together with sparse
linear layers. With the help of the so-called Long Trail argument, a de-
signer can bound the maximum diﬀerential and linear probabilities for
any number of rounds of a cipher built according to the LTS.
To illustrate the eﬀectiveness of the new strategy, we propose Sparx – a
family of ARX-based block ciphers designed according to the LTS. Sparx
has 32-bit ARX-based S-boxes and has provable bounds against diﬀer-
ential and linear cryptanalysis. In addition, Sparx is very eﬃcient on
a number of embedded platforms. Its optimized software implementa-
tion ranks in the top 6 of the most software-eﬃcient ciphers along with
Simon, Speck, Chaskey, LEA and RECTANGLE.
As a second contribution we propose another strategy for designing ARX
ciphers with provable properties, that is completely independent of the
LTS. It is motivated by a challenge proposed earlier by Wallén and uses
the diﬀerential properties of modular addition to minimize the maximum
diﬀerential probability across multiple rounds of a cipher. A new prim-
itive, called LAX, is designed following those principles. LAX partly
solves the Wallén challenge.
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1 Introduction
ARX, standing for Addition/Rotation/XOR, is a class of symmetric-key algo-
rithms designed using only the following simple operations: modular addition,
bitwise rotation and exclusive-OR. In contrast to S-box-based designs, where the
only non-linear elements are the substitution tables (S-boxes), ARX designs rely
on modular addition as the only source of non-linearity. Notable representatives
of the ARX class include the stream ciphers Salsa20 [1] and ChaCha20 [2], the
SHA-3 ﬁnalists Skein [3] and BLAKE [4] as well as several lightweight block ci-
phers such as TEA, XTEA [5], etc. Dinu et al. recently reported [6] that the most
eﬃcient software implementations on small processors belonged to ciphers from
the ARX class: Chaskey-cipher [7] by Mouha et al., speck [8] by the American
National Security Agency (NSA) and LEA [9] by the South Korean Electronic
and Telecommunications Research Institute.1
For the mentioned algorithms, the choice of using the ARX paradigm was
based on three observations2. First, getting rid of the table look-ups, associated
with S-Box based designs, increases the resilience against side-channel attacks.
Second, this design strategy minimizes the total number of operations performed
during an encryption, allowing particularly fast software implementations. Fi-
nally, the computer code describing such algorithms is very small, making this
approach especially appealing for lightweight block ciphers where the memory
requirements are the harshest.
Despite the widespread use of ARX ciphers, the following problem has re-
mained open up until now.
Open Problem. Is it possible to design an ARX cipher that is provably secure
against single-trail differential and linear cryptanalysis by design?
To the best of our knowledge, there has only been one attempt at tackling this
issue. In [10] Biryukov et al. have proposed several ARX constructions for which
it is feasible to compute the exact maximum diﬀerential and linear probabilities
over any number of rounds. However, these constructions are limited to 32-bit
blocks. The general case of this problem, addressing any block size, has still
remained without a solution.
More generally, the formal understanding of the cryptographic properties of
ARX is far less satisfying than that of, for example, S-Box-based substitution-
permutation networks (SPN). Indeed, the wide trail strategy [11] (WTS) and
the wide trail argument [12] provide a way to design S-box based SPNs with
provable resilience against diﬀerential and linear attacks. It relies on bounding
the number of active S-Boxes in a diﬀerential (resp. linear) trail and deducing a
lower bound on the best expected diﬀerential (resp. linear) probability.
1
Speck and the MAC Chaskey are being considered for standardization by ISO.
2 For Speck, we can only guess it is the case as the designers have not published the
rationale behind their algorithm.
2
Our Contribution. We propose two diﬀerent strategies to build ARX-based block
ciphers with provable bounds on the maximum expected diﬀerential and linear
probabilities, thus providing a solution to the open problem stated above.
The ﬁrst strategy is called the Long Trail Strategy (LTS). It borrows the idea
of counting the number of active S-Boxes from the wide trail argument but the
overall principle is actually the opposite to the wide trail strategy as described
in [11]. While the WTS dictates the spending of most of the computational
resources in the linear layer in order to provide good diﬀusion between small
S-boxes, the LTS advocates the use of large and comparatively expensive S-
Boxes in conjunction with cheaper and weaker linear layers. We formalize this
method and describe the Long Trail argument that can be used to bound the
diﬀerential and linear trail probabilities of a block cipher built using this strategy.
Using this framework, we build a family of lightweight block ciphers called
Sparx. All three instances in this family can be entirely speciﬁed using only three
operations: addition modulo 216, 16-bit rotations and 16-bit XOR. These ciphers
are, to the best of our knowledge, the ﬁrst ARX-based block ciphers for which the
probability of both diﬀerential and linear trails are bounded. Furthermore, while
one may think that these provable properties imply a performance degradation,
we show that it is not the case. On the contrary, Sparx ciphers have very
competitive performance on lightweight processors. In fact, the most lightweight
version – Sparx-64/128 – is in the top 3 for 16-bit micro-controllers according
to the classiﬁcation method presented in [6].
Finally, we propose the LAX construction, where bit rotations are replaced
with a more general linear permutation. The bounds on the diﬀerential proba-
bility are expressed as a function of the branching number of the linear layer.
We note that the key insight behind this construction has been published in [13],
but its realization has been left as a challenge.
Outline. First, we introduce the notations and concepts used throughout the pa-
per in Section 2. In Section 3, we describe how an ARX-based cipher with prov-
able bounds can be built using an S-Box-based approach and how the method
used is a particular case of the more general Long Trail Strategy. Section 4
contains the speciﬁcation of the Sparx family of ciphers, the description of its
design rationale and a discussion about the eﬃciency of its implementation on
microcontrollers. The LAX structure is presented in Section 5. Finally, Section 6
concludes the paper.
2 Preliminaries
We use F2 to denote the set {0, 1}. Let f : F
n
2 → F
n
2 , (a, b) ∈ F
n
2 ×F
n
2 and x ∈ F
n
2 .
We denote the probability of the diﬀerential trail (a
d
→ b) by Pr[f(x)⊕f(x⊕a) =
b] and the correlation of the linear approximation (a
ℓ
→ b) by
(
2 Pr[a · x =
b · f(x)]− 1
)
where y · z is the scalar product of y and z.
In an iterated block cipher, not all diﬀerential (respectively linear) trails are
possible. Indeed, they must be coherent with the overall structure of the round
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function. For example, it is well known that a 2-round diﬀerential trail for the
AES with less than 4 active S-Boxes is impossible. To capture this notion, we
use the following deﬁnition.
Definition 1 (Valid Trail). Let f be an n-bit permutation. A trail a0 → ...→
ar for r rounds of f is a valid trail if Pr[ai → ai+1] > 0 for all i in [0, r − 1].
The set of all valid r-round differential (respectively linear) trails for f is denoted
Vδ(f)
r (resp. Vℓ(f)
r).
We use the acronyms MEDCP and MELCC to denote resp. maximum ex-
pected differential characteristic probability and maximum expected linear char-
acteristic correlation – a signature introduced earlier in [14]. The MEDCP of
the keyed function fki : x 7→ f(x⊕ki) iterated over r rounds is deﬁned as follows:
MEDCP(fr) = max
(∆0→...∆r)∈Vδ(f)r
r−1∏
i=0
Pr[∆i
d
→ ∆i+1],
where Pr[∆i
d
→ ∆i+1] is the expected value of the diﬀerential probability of∆i
d
→
∆i+1 for the function fk when k is picked uniformly at random. MELCC(f
r) is
deﬁned analogously. Note that MEDCP(fr) and
(
MEDCP(f1)
)r
are not equal.
As designers, we thrive to provide upper bounds for both MEDCP(fr) and
MELCC(fr). Doing so allows us to compute the number of rounds f needed
in a block cipher for the probability of all trails to be too low to be usable. In
practice, we want MEDCP(fr) ≪ 2−n and MELCC(fr) ≪ 2−n/2 where n is
the block size.
While this strategy is the best known, the following limitations must be taken
into account by algorithm designers.
1. The quantities MEDCP(fr) and MELCC(fr) are relevant only if we make
theMarkov assumption, meaning that the diﬀerential and linear probabilities
are independent in each round. This would be true if the subkeys were picked
uniformly and independently at random but, as the master key has a limited
size, it is not the case.
2. These quantities are averages taken over all possible keys: it is not impossible
that there exists a weak key and a diﬀerential trail T such that the probability
of T is higher than MEDCP(fr) for this particular key. The same holds for
the linear probability.
3. These quantities deal with unique trails. However, it is possible that several
diﬀerential trails share the same input and output diﬀerences, thus leading to
a higher probability for said diﬀerential transition. This so-called differential
effect can be leveraged to decrease the data complexity of diﬀerential attack.
The same holds for linear attacks where several approximations may form a
linear hull.
Still, this type of bound is the best that can be achieved in a generic fashion (to
the best of our knowledge). In particular, this is the type of bound provided by
the wide trail argument used in the AES.
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3 ARX-Based Substitution-Permutation Network
In this section, we present a general design strategy for building ARX-based
block ciphers borrowing techniques from SPN design. The general idea is to build
a SPN with ARX-based S-boxes instead of with S-boxes based on look-up tables
(LUT). The proofs for the bound on the MEDCP and MELCC are inspired
by the wide trail argument introduced in the design of the AES [12]. However,
because of the use of large S-Boxes, the method used relies on a diﬀerent type of
interaction between the linear and non-linear layers. We call the corresponding
design strategy the Long Trail Strategy. It is quite general and could be also
applied in other contexts e.g. for non-arx constructions.
First, we present possible candidates for the ARX-based S-Box and, along
the way, identify the likely reason behind the choice of the rotation constants in
SPECK-32. Then, we describe the Long Trail Strategy in more details. Finally,
we present two diﬀerent algorithms for computing a bound for the MEDCP
and MELCC of block ciphers built using a LT strategy. We also discuss how to
ensure that the linear layer provides suﬃcient diﬀusion.
3.1 ARX-Boxes
Definition 2 (arx-box). An arx-box is a permutation on m bits (where m
is much smaller than the block size) which relies entirely on addition, rotation
and XOR to provide both non-linearity and diffusion. An arx-box is a particular
type of S-Box.
Possible constructions for arx-boxes can be found in a recent paper by
Biryukov et al. [10]. A ﬁrst one is based on the MIX function of Skein [3] and
is called Marx-2. The rotation amounts, namely {1, 2, 7, 3}, were chosen so as
to minimize the diﬀerential and linear probabilities. The key addition is done
over the full state. The second construction is called Speckey and consists of
one round of Speck-32 [8] with the key added to the full state instead of only
to half the state as in the original algorithm. The two constructions Marx-2
and Speckey are shown in Fig. 1a and 1b. The diﬀerential and linear bounds
for them are given in Table 1. While it is possible to choose the rotations used
in Speckey in such a way as to slightly decrease the diﬀerential and linear
bounds3, such rotations are more expensive on small microcontrollers which only
have instructions implementing rotations by 1 and by 8 (in both directions). We
infer, although we cannot prove it, that the designers of Speck-32 made similar
observations.
3.2 Naive Approaches and Their Limitations
A very simple method to build ARX-based ciphers with provable bounds on
MEDCP and MELCC is to use a SPN structure where the S-boxes are replaced
3 Both can be lowered by a factor of 2 if we choose rotations (9, 2), (9, 5), (11, 7) or
(7, 11) instead of (7, 2).
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Fig. 1: Key addition followed by the candidate 32-bit ARX-boxes, Marx-2 and
Speckey. The branch size is 8 bits for Marx-2, 16 bits for Speckey.
Table 1: Maximum expected diﬀerential characteristic probabilities (MEDCP)
and maximum expected absolute linear characteristic correlations (MELCC) of
Marx-2 and Speckey (log2 scale); r is the number of rounds.
r 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Marx-2
MEDCP(Mr) −0 −1 −3 −5 −11 −16 −22 −25 −29 −35
MELCC(Mr) −0 −0 −1 −3 −5 −8 −10 −13 −15 −17
Speckey
MEDCP(Sr) −0 −1 −3 −5 −9 −13 −18 −24 −30 −34
MELCC(Sr) −0 −0 −1 −3 −5 −7 −9 −12 −14 −17
by ARX operations for which we can compute the MEDCP and MELCC. This
is indeed the strategy we follow but care must be taken when actually choosing
the ARX-based operations and the linear layer.
Let us for example build a 128-bit block cipher with an S-Box layer consist-
ing in one iteration of Speckey on each 32-bit word and with an MDS linear
layer, say a multiplication with the MixColumnsmatrix with elements in GF (232)
instead of GF (28). The MEDCP bound of such a cipher, computed using a clas-
sical wide trail argument, would be equal to 1! Indeed, there exists probability
1 diﬀerentials for 1-round Speckey so that, regardless of the number of active
S-Boxes, the bound would remain equal to 1. Such an approach is therefore not
viable.
As the problem identiﬁed above stems from the use of 1-round Speckey,
we now replace it with 3-round Speckey where the iterations are interleaved
with the addition of independent round keys. The best linear and diﬀerential
probabilities are no longer equal to 1, meaning that it is possible to build a
secure cipher using the same layer as before provided that enough rounds are
used. However, such a cipher would be very ineﬃcient. Indeed, the MDS bound
imposes that 5 arx-boxes are active every 2 rounds, so that the MEDP bound
is equal to p
5r/2
d where r is the number of rounds and pd is the best diﬀerential
6
probability of the arx-box (3-rounds Speckey). To push the bound below 2−128
we need at least 18 SPN rounds, meaning 54 parallel applications of the basic
arx-round! We will show that, with our alternative approach, we can obtain the
same bounds with much fewer rounds.
3.3 The Long Trail Design Strategy
Informed by the shortcomings of the naive design strategies described in the
previous section, we devised a new method to build ARX-based primitives with
provable linear and diﬀerential bounds. It is based on the following observation.
Observation 1 (Impact of Long Trails) Let d(r) and ℓ(r) be the MEDCP
and MELCC of some arx-box iterated r times and interleaved with the addition
of independent subkeys. Then, in most cases:
d(qr)≪ d(r)q and ℓ(qr)≪ ℓ(r)q.
In other words, in order to diminish the MEDCP and MELCC of a construc-
tion, it is better to allow long trails of arx-boxes without mixing.
For example, if we look at Speckey, the MEDCP for 3 rounds is 2−3 and
that of 6 rounds is 2−15 which is far smaller than (2−3)2 = 2−6 (see Table 1).
Similarly, the MELCC for 3 rounds is 2−1 and after 6 rounds it is 2−7 ≪ (2−1)2.
In fact, a similar observation has been made by Nikolić when designing the
CAESAR candidate family Tiaoxin [15]. It was later generalized to larger block
sizes in [16], where Jean and Nikolić present, among others, the AES-based A2⊕
permutation family. It uses a partial S-Box layer where the S-Box consists of
2 AES rounds and a word-oriented linear layer in such a way that some of the
S-Box calls can be chained within 2-round long trails. Thus, they may use the 4-
round bound on the number of active 8-bit AES S-Boxes, which is 25, rather than
twice the 2-round bound, which would be equal to 10 (see Table 2). Their work
on this permutation can be interpreted as a particular case of the observation
above.
Table 2: Bound on the number of active 8-bit S-Boxes in a diﬀerential (or linear)
trail for the AES.
# R 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
# Active S-Boxes 1 5 9 25 26 30 34 50 51 55
Definition 3 (Long Trail).We call Long Trail (LT) an uninterrupted sequence
of calls to an arx-box interleaved with key additions. No difference can be added
into the trail from the outside. Such trails can happen for two reasons.
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1. A Static Long Trail occurs with probability 1 because one output word of the
linear layer is an unchanged copy of one of its input words.
2. A Dynamic Long Trail occurs within a specific differential trail because one
output word of the linear layer consists of the XOR of one of its input words
with a non-zero difference and a function of words with a zero difference. In
this way the output word of the linear layer is again equal to the input word
as in a Static LT, but here this effect has been obtained dynamically.
Definition 4 (Long Trail Strategy). The Long Trail Strategy is a design
guideline: when designing a primitive with a rather weak but large S-Box (say,
an ARX-based permutation), it is better to foster the existence of long trails
rather than to have maximum diffusion in each linear layer.
This design principle has an obvious caveat: although slow, diﬀusion is nec-
essary! Unlike the WTS, in this context it is better to trade some of the power
of the diﬀusion layer in favor of facilitating the emergence of long trails.
The Long Trail Strategy is a method for building secure and eﬃcient ciphers
using a large but weak S-Box S such that we can bound the MEDCP (and
MELCC) of several iterations of x 7→ S(x ⊕ k) with independent round keys.
In this paper, we focus on the case where S consists of arx operations but this
strategy could have broader applications such as, as brieﬂy discussed above, the
design of block ciphers operating on large blocks using the AES round function
as a building block.
In a way, this design method is the direct opposite of the wide trail strategy
as it is summarized by Daemen and Rijmen in [11] (emphasis ours):
Instead of spending most of the resources on large S-boxes, the wide trail
strategy aims at designing the round transformation(s) such that there
are no trails with a low bundle weight. In ciphers designed by the wide
trail strategy, a relatively large amount of resources is spent in the linear
step to provide high multiple-round diﬀusion.
The long trail approach minimizes the amount of resources spent in the linear
layer and does spend most of the resources on large S-Boxes. Still, as discussed
in the next section, the method used to bound the MEDCP and MELCC in the
Long Trail Strategy is heavily inspired by the one used in the wide trail strategy.
A Cipher Structure for the LT Strategy We can build block ciphers based
on the Long Trail Strategy using the following two-level structure. First, we must
choose an S-Box layer operating on w words in parallel. The composition of a
key addition in the full state and the application of this S-Box layer is called a
round. Several rounds are iterated and then a word-oriented linear mixing layer
is applied to ensure diﬀusion between the words. The composition of r rounds
followed by the linear mixing layer is called a step4, as described in Fig. 2. The
encryption thus consists in iterating such steps. We used this design strategy to
build a block cipher family, Sparx, which we describe in Section 4.
4 This terminology is borrowed from the speciﬁcation of LED [17] which also groups
several calls of the round function into a step.
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Fig. 2: A cipher structure for the LT strategy.
Long Trail-Based Bounds In what follows we only discuss diﬀerential long
trails for the sake of brevity. Linear long trails are treated identically.
Definition 5 (Truncated LT Decomposition). Consider a cipher with a
round function operating on w words. A truncated differential trail is a sequence
of values of {0, 1}w describing whether an S-Box is active at a given round.
The LT Decomposition of a truncated differential trail is obtained by grouping
together the words of the differential trails into long trails and then counting how
many active long trails of each length are present. It is denoted {ti}i≥1 where ti
is equal to the number of truncated long trails with length i.
Example 1. Consider a 64-bit block cipher using a 32-bit S-Box, one round of
Feistel network as its linear layer and 4 steps without a ﬁnal linear layer. Consider
the diﬀerential trail (δL0 , δ
R
0 ) → (δ
L
1 , δ
R
1 ) → (0, δ
R
2 ) → (δ
L
3 , 0) (see Fig. 3 where
the zero diﬀerence is dashed). Then this diﬀerential trail can be decomposed into
3 long trails represented in black, blue and red: the ﬁrst one has length 1 and
δR0 as its input; the second one has length 2 and δ
L
0 as its input; and the third
one has length 3 and δL1 as its input so that the LT decomposition of this trail is
{t1 = 1, t2 = 1, t3 = 1}. Using the terminology introduced earlier, the ﬁrst two
trails are Static LT, while the third one is a Dynamic LT.
Theorem 1 (Long Trail Argument). Consider a truncated differential trail
T covering r rounds consisting of an S-Box layer with S-Box S interleaved with
key additions and some linear layer. Let {ti}i≥1 be the LT decomposition of T .
Then the probability pD of any fully specified differential trail fitting in T is
upper-bounded by
pD ≤
∏
i≥1
(
MEDCP(Si)
)ti
where MEDCP(Si) is an upper-bound on the probability of a differential trail
covering i iterations of S.
Proof. Let ∆i,s
d
→ ∆j,s+1 denote any diﬀerential trail occurring at the S-Box
level in one step, so that the S-Box with index i at step s sees the transition
∆i,s
d
→ ∆j,s+1. By deﬁnition of a long trail, we have in each long trail a chain of
diﬀerential trails ∆i0,s0
d
→ ∆i1,s0+1
d
→ ...
d
→ ∆it,s0+t which, because of the lack
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Fig. 3: An example of active LT decomposition.
of injection of diﬀerences from the outside, is a valid trail for t iterations of the S-
Box. This means that the probability of any diﬀerential trail following the same
sequence of S-boxes as in this long trail is upper-bounded by MEDCP(St). We
simply bound the product by the product of the bounds to derive the theorem.
⊓⊔
3.4 Choosing the Linear Layer: Bounding the MEDCP and
MELCC while Providing Diffusion
In order to remain as general as possible, in this section we do not consider the
details of a speciﬁc S-Box but instead we focus on ﬂeshing out design criteria
for the linear layer. All the information for the S-Box that is necessary to follow
the explanation is the MEDCP and MELCC of its r-fold iterations including
the key additions e.g. the data provided in Table 1 for our arx-box candidates.
As the linear layers we consider may be weaker than usual designing spn,
it is also crucial that we ensure that ciphers built using such a linear layer are
not vulnerable to integral attacks [18], in particular those based on the divi-
sion property [19]. Incidentally, this gives us a criteria quantifying the diﬀusion
provided by several steps of the cipher.
In this section, we propose two methods for bounding the MEDCP and
MELCC of several steps of a block cipher. The ﬁrst one is applicable to any
linear layer but is relatively ineﬃcient, while the second one works only for a
speciﬁc subset of linear layers but is very eﬃcient.
When considering truncated diﬀerential trails, it is hard to bound the proba-
bility of the event that diﬀerences in two or more words cancel each other in the
linear layer. Therefore, for simplicity we assume that such cancellations happen
for free i.e. with probability 1. Due to this simpliﬁcation, we expect our bounds
to be higher (i.e. looser) than the tight bounds. In other words, we underesti-
mate the security of the cipher. Note that we also exclude the cases where the
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full state at some round has zero diﬀerence as the latter is impossible due to the
cipher being a permutation.
Algorithms for Bounding MEDCP and MELCC of a cipher. In this
sub-section we propose generic approaches that do not depend on the number of
rounds per step. In fact, to fully avoid the confusion between rounds and steps
in what follows we shall simply refer to SPN rounds.
One way to bound the MEDCP and MELCC of a cipher is as follows:
1. Enumerate all possible truncated trails composed of active/inactive S-boxes.
2. Find an optimal decomposition of each trail into long trails (LT).
3. Bound the probability of each trail using the product of the MEDCP (resp.
MELCC) of all active long trails i.e. by applying the Long Trail Argument
(see Theorem 1) on the corresponding optimal trail decomposition.
4. The maximum bound over all trails is the ﬁnal upper bound.
This approach is feasible only for a small number of rounds, because the
number of trails grows exponentially. This case is still of large interest so we
sketch an eﬀective algorithm for the only nontrivial step, the second one, in
Appendix A.3. The algorithm is based on a recursive dynamic programming
approach and has time complexity O(wr2), where w is the number of S-Boxes
applied in parallel in each S-Box layer and r is the number of rounds.
As noted, the most complicated step in the above procedure is ﬁnding an
optimal decomposition of a given truncated trail into long trails. The diﬃculty
arises from the so-called branching: situation in which a long trail may be ex-
tended in more than one way. Recall that our deﬁnition of LT (cf. Deﬁnition 3)
relies on the fact that there is no linear transformation on a path between two
S-Boxes in a LT. The only transformations allowed are some XORs. Therefore,
branching happens only when some output word of the linear layer receives two
or more active input words without modiﬁcations. In order to cut oﬀ the branch-
ing eﬀect (and thus to make ﬁnding the optimal decomposition of a LT feasible),
we can put some additional linear functions that will modify the contribution of
(some of) the input words. Equivalently, when choosing a linear layer we simply
do not consider layers which cause branching of LTs. As we will show later, this
restriction has many advantages.
To simplify our study of the linear layer, we introduce a matrix representation
for it. In a block cipher operating on w words, a linear layer may be expressed
as a w × w block matrix. We will denote zero and identity sub-matrices by
0 and 1 respectively and an unspeciﬁed (arbitrary) sub-matrices by L. This
information is suﬃcient for analyzing the high-level structure of a cipher. Using
this notation, the linear layers to which we restrict our analysis have matrices
where each column has at most one 1.
For the special subset of linear layers outlined above, we present an algorithm
for obtaining MEDCP and MELCC bounds, that is based on a dynamic pro-
gramming approach. Since there is no LT branching, any truncated trail consists
of disjoint sequences of active S-Boxes. By Observation 1, we can treat each such
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sequence as a LT to obtain an optimal decomposition. Because of this simpli-
ﬁcation, we can avoid enumerating all trails by grouping them in a particular
way.
We proceed round by round and maintain a set of best trails up to an equiv-
alence relation, which is deﬁned as follows. For all S-Boxes at the current last
round s, we assign a number, which is equal to the length of the LT that covers
this S-Box, or zero if the S-Box is not active. We say that two truncated trails for
s steps are equivalent if the tuples consisting of those numbers (lengths of LTs)
are the same for both trails. This equivalence captures the possibility to replace
some preﬁx of a trail by an equivalent one without breaking the validity of the
trail or its LT decomposition. The total probability, however, can change. The
key observation here is that from two equivalent trails we can keep only the one
with the highest current probability. Indeed, if the optimal truncated trail for all
r rounds is an extension of the trail for s rounds with lower probability, we can
take the ﬁrst s rounds from the trail with higher probability without breaking
anything and obtain a better trail, which contradicts the assumed optimality.
The pseudo-code for the algorithm is given in Appendix A.3.
This algorithm can be used to bound the probability of linear trails. Propaga-
tion of a linear mask through some linear layer can be described by multiplying
the mask by the transposed inverse of the linear layer’s matrix. In our matrix
notation we can easily transpose the matrix but inversion is harder. However, we
can build the linear trails bottom-up (i.e. starting from the last round): in this
case we need only the transposed initial matrix. Our algorithm does not depend
on the direction, so we obtain bounds on linear trails probabilities by running
the algorithm on the transposed matrix using the linear bounds for the iterated
S-box.
Ensuring Resilience Against Integral Attacks As illustrated by the struc-
tural attack against SASAS and a recent generalization [20] to ciphers with more
rounds, a spn with few rounds may be vulnerable to integral attacks. This at-
tack strategy has been further improved by Todo [19] who proposed the so-called
division property as a means to track which bit should be ﬁxed in the input to
have a balanced output. He also described an algorithm allowing an attacker to
easily ﬁnd such distinguishers.
We implemented this algorithm to search for division-property-based integral
trails covering as many rounds as possible. With it, for each matrix candidate
we compute a maximum number of rounds covered by such a distinguisher. This
quantity can then be used by the designer of the primitive to see if the level of
protection provided against this type of attack is suﬃcient or not.
Tracking the evolution of the division property through the linear layer re-
quires special care. In order to do this, we ﬁrst make a copy of each word and
apply the required XORs from the copy to the original words. Due to such state
expansion, the algorithm requires both a lot of memory and time. In fact, it is
even infeasible to apply on some matrices. To overcome this issue, we ran the al-
gorithm with reduced word size. During our experiments, we observed that such
12
an optimization may only result in longer integral characteristics and that this
side eﬀect occurs only for very small word sizes (4 or 5 bits). In light of this, we
conjecture that the values obtained in these particular cases are upper bounds
and are very close to the values which could be obtained without reducing the
word size.
4 The Sparx Family of Ciphers
In this Section, we describe a family of block ciphers built using the framework
laid out in the previous section. The instance with block size n and key size k is
denoted Sparx-n/k.
4.1 High Level View
The plaintexts and ciphertexts consist of w = n/32 words of 32 bits each and
the key is divided into v = k/32 such words. The encryption consists of ns steps,
each composed of an arx-box layer of ra rounds and a linear mixing layer. In the
arx-box layer, each word of the internal state undergoes ra rounds of Speckey,
including key additions. The v words in the key state are updated once ra arx-
boxes have been applied to one word of the internal state. The linear layers λw
for w = 2, 4 provide linear mixing for the w words of the internal state.
This structure is summarized by the pseudo-code in Algorithm 1. The struc-
ture of one round is represented in Fig. 4, where A is the 32-bit arx-box con-
sisting in one unkeyed Speck-32 round. We also use Aa to denote a rounds of
Speckey with the corresponding key additions (see Fig. 5a).
Algorithm 1 Sparx encryption
Inputs plaintext (x0, ..., xw−1); key (k0, ..., kv−1)
Output ciphertext (y0, ..., yw−1)
Let yi ← xi for all i ∈ [0, ..., w − 1]
for all s ∈ [0, ns − 1] do
for all i ∈ [0, w − 1] do
for all r ∈ [0, ra − 1] do
yi ← yi ⊕ kr
yi ← A(yi)
end for
(k0, ..., kv−1)← Kv
(
(k0, ..., kv−1)
)
⊲ Update key state
end for
(y0, ..., yw−1)← λw
(
(y0, ..., yw−1)
)
⊲ Linear mixing layer
end for
Let yi ← yi ⊕ ki for all i ∈ [0, ..., w − 1] ⊲ Final key addition
return (y0, ..., yw−1)
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kswra−1
ksw+w−10
ksw+w−1ra−1
(a) Round function of Sparx.
kr0 k
r
1
... krv−1
Kv
kr+10 k
r+1
1
... kr+1v−1
(b) Key schedule.
Fig. 4: A high level view of step s of Sparx.
The diﬀerent versions of Sparx all share the same deﬁnition of A. However,
the permutations λw and Kv depend on the block and key sizes. The diﬀerent
members of the Sparx-family are speciﬁed below. The round keys can either be
derived on the ﬂy by applying Kv on the key state during encryption or they can
be precomputed and stored. The ﬁrst option requires less RAM, while the second
is faster. The only operations needed to implement any instance of Sparx are:
– addition modulo 216, denoted ⊞,
– 16-bit exclusive-or (XOR), denoted ⊕, and
– 16-bit rotation to the left or right by i, denoted respectively x ≪ i and
x≫ i.
We claim that no attack using less than 2k operations exists against Sparx-n/k
in neither the single-key nor in the related-key setting. We also faithfully declare
that we have not hidden any weakness in these ciphers. Sparx is free for use
and its source code is available in the public domain 5.
4.2 Specification
Table 3 summarizes the diﬀerent Sparx instances and their parameters. The
quantity minsecure(ns) corresponds to the minimum number of steps for which
we can prove that the MEDCP is below 2−n, that the MELCC is below 2−n/2
for the number of rounds per step chosen and for which we cannot ﬁnd integral
distinguishers covering this amount of steps.
Sparx-64/128 The lightest instance of Sparx is Sparx-64/128. It operates
on two words of 32 bits and uses a 128-bit key. There are 8 steps and 3 rounds
per step. As it takes 5 steps to achieve provable security against linear and
diﬀerential attacks, our security margin is at least equal to 37% of the rounds.
Furthermore, while our Long Trail argument proves that 5 steps are suﬃcient to
ensure that there are no single-trail diﬀerential and linear distinguishers, we do
not expect this bound to be tight.
5 See https://www.cryptolux.org/index.php/SPARX.
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Table 3: The diﬀerent Sparx instances.
Sparx-64/128 Sparx-128/128 Sparx-128/256
# State words w 2 4 4
# Key words v 4 4 8
# Rounds/Step ra 3 4 4
# Steps ns 8 8 10
Best Attack (# rounds) 15/24 22/32 24/40
minsecure(ns) 5 5 5
The linear layer λ2 simply consists of a Feistel round using L as a Feistel func-
tion. The general structure of a step of Sparx-64/128 is provided in Fig. 5b.
The 128-bit permutation used in the key schedule has a simple deﬁnition sum-
marized in Fig. 6, where the counter r is initialized to 0. It corresponds to the
pseudo code given in Algorithm 2, where (z)L and (z)R are the 16-bit left and
right halves of the 32-bit word z.
⊕ ⊕
A
A
⊕ ⊕
k0L k
0
R
kr−1L k
r−1
R
(a) Ark.
xs0 x
s
1
k2s k2s+1A3 A3
L
0
1
⊕
⊕
(b) Step structure.
⊕
⊕ ⊕
≪ 8
0 1
(c) L.
Fig. 5: A high level view of Sparx-64/128. Branches have a width of 16 bits
(except for the keys in the step structure).
The L function is borrowed from Noekeon [21] and can be deﬁned using
16- or 32-bit rotations. It is deﬁned as a Lai-Massey structure mapping a 32-bit
value x||y to x ⊕
(
(x ⊕ y)≪ 8
)
||y ⊕
(
(x ⊕ y)≪ 8
)
. Alternatively, it can be
seen as a mapping of a 32-bit value z to z ⊕ (z≪32 8)⊕ (z≫32 8) where the
rotations are over 32 bits.
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k0 k1 k2 k3
A
⊞
⊞
⊞r + 1
Fig. 6: K644 (used in Sparx-64/128).
r ← r + 1
k0 ← A(k0)
(k1)L ← (k1)L + (k0)L mod 2
16
(k1)R ← (k1)R + (k0)R mod 2
16
(k3)R ← (k3)R + r mod 2
16
k0, k1, k2, k3 ← k3, k0, k1, k2
Algorithm 2: Pseudo-code of K644
Sparx-128/128 and Sparx-128/256 For use cases in which a larger block
size can be aﬀorded, we provide Sparx instances with a 128-bit block size and
128- or 256-bit keys. They share an identical step structure which is fairly similar
to Sparx-64/128. Indeed, the linear layer relies again on a Feistel function except
that L is replaced by L′, a permutation of {0, 1}64. Both Sparx-128/128 and
Sparx-128/256 use 4 rounds per step but the ﬁrst uses 8 steps while the last
uses 10.
xs0 x
s
1 x
s
2 x
s
3
k4s k4s+1 k4s+2 k4s+3A4 A4 A4 A4
L′
⊕
⊕
⊕
⊕
0
1
2
3
(a) Step structure.
⊕
⊕
⊕ ⊕
⊕
≪ 8
0 1 2 3
(b) L′.
Fig. 7: The step structure of both Sparx-128/128 and Sparx-128/256.
The Feistel function L′ can be deﬁned as follows. Let a||b||c||d be a 64-bit
word where each a, ..., d is 16-bit long. Let t = (a ⊕ b ⊕ c ⊕ d) ≪ 8. Then
L′(a||b||c||d) = c⊕t || b⊕t || a⊕t || d⊕t. This function can also be expressed using
32-bit rotations. Let x||y be the concatenation of two 32-bit words and L′b denote
L′ without its ﬁnal branch swap. Let t =
(
(x ⊕ y)≫32 8
)
⊕
(
(x ⊕ y)≪32 8
)
,
then L′b(x||y) = x ⊕ t||y ⊕ t. Alternatively, we can use L to compute L
′
b as
follows: L′b(x||y) = y ⊕ L(x⊕ y)||x⊕ L(x⊕ y).
These two ciphers, Sparx-128/128 and Sparx-128/256, diﬀer only by their
number of steps and by their key schedule. The key schedule of Sparx-128/128
needs a 128-bit permutation K1284 described in Fig. 8 and Algorithm 3 while
Sparx-128/256 uses a 256-bit permutation K2564 , which is presented in both
Fig. 9 and Algorithm 4.
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k0 k1 k2 k3
A A
⊞
⊞
⊞
⊞
⊞r + 1
Fig. 8: The 128-bit permutation
K1284 used in Sparx-128/128.
r ← r + 1
k0 ← A(k0)
(k1)L ← (k1)L + (k0)L mod 2
16
(k1)R ← (k1)R + (k0)R mod 2
16
k2 ← A(k2)
(k3)L ← (k3)L + (k2)L mod 2
16
(k3)R ← (k3)R + (k2)R + r mod 2
16
k0, k1, k2, k3 ← k3, k0, k1, k2
Algorithm 3: Pseudo-code of K1284
k0 k1 k2 k3 k4 k5 k6 r7
A A
⊞
⊞
⊞
⊞
⊞r + 1
Fig. 9: The 256-bit permutation K2568 used in Sparx-128/256.
Algorithm 4 Sparx-128/256 key schedule permutation K2568 .
r ← r + 1
k0 ← A(k0)
(k1)L ← (k1)L + (k0)L mod 2
16
(k1)R ← (k1)R + (k0)R mod 2
16
k4 ← A(k4)
(k5)L ← (k5)L + (k4)L mod 2
16
(k5)R ← (k5)R + (k4)R + r mod 2
16
k0, k1, k2, k3, k4, k5, k6, k7 ← k5, k6, k7, k0, k1, k2, k3, k4
4.3 Design Rationale
Choosing the arx-box. We chose the round function of Speckey/Speck-
32 over Marx-2 because of its superior implementation properties. Indeed, its
smaller total number of operations means that a cipher using it needs to do
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fewer operations when implemented on a 16-bit platform. Ideally, we would have
used an arx-box with 32-bit operations but, at the time of writing, no such
function has known diﬀerential and linear bounds (cf. Table 1) for suﬃciently
many rounds.
We chose to evaluate the iterations of the arx-box over each branch rather
than in parallel because such an order decreases the number of times each 32-
bit branch must be loaded in CPU registers. This matters when the number of
registers is too small to contain both the full key and the full internal state of
the cipher and does not change anything if it is not the case.
Mixing Layer, Number of Steps and Rounds per Step. Our main ap-
proach for choosing the mixing layer was exhaustive enumeration of all matrices
suitable for our long trail bounding algorithm from Section 3.4 and selecting the
ﬁnal matrix according to various criteria, which we will discuss later.
For Sparx-64/128, there is only one linear layer fulﬁlling our design criteria:
one corresponding to a Feistel round. For such a structure, we found that the best
integral covers 4 steps (without the last linear layer) and that, with 3 rounds
per step, the MEDCP and MELCC are bounded by 2−75 and 2−38. These
quantities imply that no single trail diﬀerential or linear distinguisher exists for
5 or more steps of Sparx-64/128.
For Sparx instances with 128-bit block we implemented an exhaustive search
on a large subset of all possible linear layers. After some ﬁltering, we arrived at
roughly 3000 matrices. For each matrix we ran our algorithm from Section 3.4
to obtain bounds on MEDCP and MELCC for diﬀerent values of the num-
ber of rounds per step (ra). We also ran the algorithm for searching integral
characteristics described in Section 3.4.
Then, we analyzed the best matrices and found that there is a matrix which
corresponds to a Feistel-like linear layer with the best diﬀerential/linear bound
for ra = 4. This choice also oﬀered good compromise between other parameters,
such as diﬀusion, strength of the ARX-box, simplicity and easiness/eﬃciency of
implementation. It also generalizes elegantly the linear layer of Sparx-64/128.
We thus settled for this Feistel-like function.
For more details on the selection procedure and other interesting candidates
for the linear layer we refer the reader to Appendix A.4.
The Linear Feistel Functions The linear layer obtained using the steps de-
scribed above is only speciﬁed at a high level, it remains to deﬁne the linear
Feistel functions L and L′. The function L that we have chosen has been used
in the Lai-Massey round constituting the linear layer of Noekeon [21]. We
reuse it here because it is cheap on lightweight processors as it only necessitates
one rotation by 8 bits and 3 XORs. It also provides some diﬀusion as it has
branching number 3. Its alternative representation using 32-bit rotations allows
an optimized implementation on 32-bit processors.
Used for a larger block size, the Feistel function L′ is a generalization of
L: it also relies on a Lai-Massey structure as well as a rotation by 8 bits. The
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reason behind these choices are the same as before: eﬃciency and diﬀusion.
Furthermore, L′ must also provide diﬀusion between the branches. While this is
achieved by the XORs, we further added a branch swap in the bits of highest
weight. This ensures that if only one 32-bit branch is active at the input of L′ then
two branches are active in its output. Indeed, there are two possibilities: either
the output of the rotation is non-zero, in which case it gets added to the other
branch and spreads to the whole state through the branch swap. Otherwise, the
output is equal to 0, which means that the two 16-bit branches constituting the
non-zero 32-bit branch hold the same non-zero value. These will then be spread
over the two output 32-bit branches by the branch swap. The permutation L′ also
breaks the 32-bit word structure, which can help prevent the spread of integral
patterns.
Key Schedule The key schedules of the diﬀerent versions of Sparx have been
designed using the following general guidelines.
First, we look at criteria related to the implementation. To limit code size,
components from the round function of Sparx are re-used in the key-schedule
itself. To accommodate cases where the memory requirements are particularly
stringent, we allow an eﬃcient on-the-ﬂy computation of the key.
We also consider cryptographic criteria. For example, we need to ensure that
the keys used within each chain of 3 or 4 arx-boxes are independent from one
another. As we do not have enough entropy from the master key to generate
truly independent round keys, we must also ensure that the round-keys are as
diﬀerent as possible from one another. This implies a fast mixing of the master
key bits in the key schedule. Furthermore, in order to prevent slide attacks [22],
we chose to have the round keys depend on the round index. Finally, since the
subkeys are XOR-ed in the key state, we want to limit the presence of high
probability diﬀerential pattern in the key update. Diﬀusion in the key state is
thus provided by additions modulo 216 rather than exclusive-or. While there
may be high probability patterns for additive diﬀerences, these would be of little
use because the key is added by an XOR to the state.
As with most engineering tasks, some of these requirements are at odds
against each other. For example, it is impossible to provide extremely fast diﬀu-
sion while also being extremely lightweight. Our designs are the most satisfying
compromises we could ﬁnd.
4.4 Security Analysis
Single Trail Differential/Linear Attack By design and thanks to the Long
Trail argument, we know that there is no diﬀerential or linear trail covering
5 steps (or more) with a useful probability for any instance of Sparx. There-
fore, the 8 steps used by Sparx-64/128 and Sparx-128/128 and the 10 used by
Sparx-128/256 are suﬃcient to ensure resilience against such attacks.
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Attacks Exploiting a Slow Diffusion We consider several attacks in this cat-
egory, namely impossible and truncated diﬀerential attacks, meet-in-the middle
attacks as well as integral attacks.
When we chose the linear layers, we ensured that they prevented division-
property-based integral attacks, meaning that they provide good diﬀusion. Fur-
thermore, the Feistel structure of the linear layer makes it easy to analyse and
increases our conﬁdence in our designs. In the case of 128-bit block sizes, the
Feistel function L′ has branching number 3 in the sense that if only one 32-bit
branch is active then the two output branches are active. This prevents attacks
trying to exploit patterns at the branch level. Finally, this Feistel function also
breaks the 32-bit word structure through a 16-bit branch swap which frustrates
the propagation of integral characteristics.
Meet-in-the-middle attacks are further hindered by the large number of key
additions. This liberal use of the key material also makes it harder for an attacker
to guess parts of it to add rounds at the top or at the bottom of, say, a diﬀerential
characteristic.
Best Attacks The best attacks we could ﬁnd are integral attacks based on
Todo’s division property. The attack against Sparx-64/128 covers 15/24 rounds
and recovers the key in time 2101 using 237 chosen plaintexts and 264 blocks
of memory. For 22-round Sparx-128/128, we can recover the key in time 2105
using 2102 chosen plaintexts and 272 blocks of memory. Finally, we attack 24-
round Sparx-128/256 in time 2233, using 2104 chosen plaintexts and 2202 blocks
of memory. A description of these attacks as well as the description of some
time/data tradeoﬀs are provided in the Appendix A.2.
4.5 Software Implementation
Next we describe how Sparx can be eﬃciently implemented on three resource
constrained microcontrollers widely used in the Internet of Things (IoT), namely
the 8-bit Atmel ATmega128, the 16-bit TI MSP430, and the 32-bit ARM Cortex-
M3. We support the described optimization strategies with performance ﬁgures
extracted from assembly implementations of Sparx-64/128 and Sparx-128/128
using the FELICS open-source benchmarking framework [23]. We use the same
tool to get the most suitable implementations of Sparx for the two IoT-speciﬁc
usage scenarios described in [6]. The ﬁrst scenario uses a block cipher to encrypt
128 bytes of data using CBC mode, while the second encrypts 128 bits of data
using a cipher in CTR mode. The most suitable implementation for a given usage
scenario is selected using the Figure of Merit (FOM) deﬁned in [6]:
FOM(i1, i2, i3) =
pi1,AV R + pi2,MSP + pi3,ARM
3
,
where the performance parameter pi,d aggregates the code size, the RAM con-
sumption, and the execution time for implementation i according to the require-
ments of the usage scenario. The smaller the FOM value of an implementation
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in a certain use case, the better (more suitable) is the implementation for that
particular use case. Finally, we compare the results of our implementations with
the results available on the tool’s website.6
Table 4: Performance characteristics of the main components of Sparx
Component
AVR MSP ARM
cycles registers cycles registers cycles registers
A 16 4 + 1 9 2 11 1 + 3
A−1 19 4 9 2 12 1 + 3
λ2 – 1-step 24 8 + 1 11 4 + 3 5 2 + 1
λ2 – 2-steps 12 8 7 4 + 1 3 2
λ4 – 1-step 48 16 + 2 36 8 + 1 16 4 + 5
λ4 – 2-steps 24 16 + 2 13 8 + 1 12 4 + 4
Implementation Aspects In order to eﬃciently implement Sparx on a re-
source constrained embedded processor, it is important to have a good under-
standing of its instruction set architecture (ISA). The number of general-purpose
registers determines whether the entire cipher’s state can be ﬁtted into registers
or whether a part of it has to be spilled to RAM. Memory operations are gen-
erally slower than register operations, consume more energy and increase the
vulnerability of an implementation to side channel attacks [24]. Thus, the num-
ber of memory operations should be reduced as much as possible. Ideally the
state should only be read from memory at the beginning of the cryptographic
operation and written back at the end. Concerning the three targets we imple-
mented Sparx for, they have 32 8-bit, 12 16-bit, and 13 32-bit general-purpose
registers, which result in a total capacity of 256 bits, 192 bits, and bits bytes for
AVR, MSP, and ARM, respectively.
The Sparx family’s simple structure consists only of three components: the
arx-box A and its inverse A−1, the linear layer λ2 or λ4 (depending on the
version), and the key addition. The key addition (bitwise XOR) does not require
additional registers and its execution time is proportional to the ratio between
the operand width and the target device’s register width. The execution time in
cycles and the number of registers required to perform A, A−1, λ2, and λ4 on
each target device are given in Table 4.
The costly operation in terms of both execution time and number of required
registers is the linear layer. The critical point is reached for the 128-bit linear
6 We submitted our implementations of Sparx to the FELICS framework. Up to date
results are available at https://www.cryptolux.org/index.php/FELICS.
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layer λ4 on MSP, which requires 13 registers. Since this requirement is above
the number of available registers, a part of the state has to be saved onto the
stack. Consequently, the execution time increases by 5 cycles for each push –
pop instruction pair.
A 2-step implementation uses a simpliﬁed linear layer without the most re-
source demanding part – the branch swaps. It processes the result of the left
branch after the ﬁrst step as the right branch of the second step and similarly
the result of the right branch after the ﬁrst step as the left branch of the second
step. This technique reduces the number of required registers and improves the
execution time at the cost of an increase in code size. The performance gain is
a factor of 2 on AVR, 2.7 on MSP, and 1.3 on ARM.
Table 5: Diﬀerent trade-oﬀs between the execution time and code size for en-
cryption of a block using Sparx-64/128 and Sparx-128/128. Minimal values are
given in bold.
Implementation
Block AVR MSP ARM
size Time Code RAM Time Code RAM Time Code RAM
[bits] [cyc.] [B] [B] [cyc.] [B] [B] [cyc.] [B] [B]
1-step rolled 64 1789 248 2 1088 166 14 1370 176 28
1-step unrolled 64 1641 424 1 907 250 12 1100 348 24
2-steps rolled 64 1677 356 2 1034 232 10 1331 304 28
2-steps unrolled 64 1529 712 1 853 404 8 932 644 24
1-step rolled 128 4553 504 11 2809 300 26 3463 348 44
1-step unrolled 128 4165 1052 10 2353 584 24 2784 884 40
2-steps rolled 128 4345 720 11 2593 432 18 3399 620 40
2-steps unrolled 128 3957 1820 10 2157 1004 16 2377 1692 36
The linear transformations L and L′ exhibit interesting implementation prop-
erties. For each platform there is a diﬀerent optimal way to perform them. The
optimal way to implement the linear layers on MSP is using the representations
from Fig. 5c and Fig. 7b. On ARM the optimal implementation performs the
rotations directly on 32-bit values. The function L can be executed on AVR
using 12 XOR instructions and no additional registers. On the other hand, the
optimal implementation of L′ on AVR requires 2 additional registers and takes
24 cycles. 7
The linear layer performed after the last step of Sparx can be dropped
without aﬀecting the security of the cipher, but it turns out that it results in
poorer overall performances. The only case when this strategy helps is when top
7 For more details please see the implementations submitted to the FELICS framework
(https://www.cryptolux.org/index.php/FELICS).
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execution time is the main and only concern of an implementation. Thus we
preferred to keep the symmetry of the step function and the overall balanced
performance ﬁgures.
The salient implementation-related feature of Sparx family of ciphers is
given by the simple and ﬂexible structure of the step function depicted in Fig. 4,
which can be implemented using diﬀerent optimization strategies. Depending on
speciﬁc constraints, such as code size, speed, or energy requirements to name a
few, the rounds inside the step function can be rolled or unrolled; one or two
step functions can be computed at once. The main possible trade-oﬀs between
the execution time and code size are explored in Table 5.
Except for the 1-step implementation of Sparx-128/128 on MSP, which
needs RAM memory to save the cipher’s state, all other RAM requirements
are determined only by the process of saving the context onto the stack at the
begging of the measured function. Thus, the RAM consumption of a pure as-
sembly implementation would be zero, except for the 1-step rolled and unrolled
implementations of Sparx-128/128 on MSP.
Table 6: The performance metrics of the balanced (globally eﬃcient) implemen-
tations of Sparx-64/128 and Sparx-128/128 as revealed using the Figure of
Merit (FOM) deﬁned in FELICS.
Block AVR MSP ARM FOM
size Time Code RAM Time Code RAM Time Code RAM
[bits] [cyc.] [B] [B] [cyc.] [B] [B] [cyc.] [B] [B]
Scenario 1 – Encryption of 128 bytes of data using CBC mode
64 30256 358 10 16113 338 22 19131 456 56 8.6
128 37984 614 19 24056 404 36 30466 428 68 12.9
Scenario 2 – Encryption of 128 bits of data using CTR mode
64 4397 662 51 2261 580 52 2338 654 72 8.3
128 5478 1184 74 3057 1036 72 2935 1468 104 12.4
Due to the 16-bit nature of the cipher, performing A and A−1 on a 32-bit
platform requires a little bit more execution time and more auxiliary registers
than performing the same operations on a 16-bit platform. The process of packing
and unpacking a state register to extract and store back the two 16-bit branches
of A or A−1 adds a performance penalty. The cost is ampliﬁed by the fact that
the ﬂexible second operand can not be used with a constant to extract the least or
most signiﬁcant 16 bits of a 32-bit register. Thus an additional masking register
is required.
The simple key schedules of Sparx-64/128 and Sparx-128/128 can be im-
plemented in diﬀerent ways. The most eﬃcient implementation turns out to be
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the one using the 1-iteration rolled strategy. Another interesting approach is the
4-iterations unrolled strategy, which has the beneﬁt that the ﬁnal permutation
is achieved for free by changing the order in which the registers are stored in the
round keys. This strategy increases the code size by up to a factor of 4, while
the execution time is on average 25% better.
Although we do not provide performance ﬁgures for Sparx-128/256, we em-
phasize that the only diﬀerences with respect to implementation aspects between
Sparx-128/256 and Sparx-128/128 are the key schedules and the diﬀerent num-
ber of steps.
Evaluation and Comparison We evaluate the performance of our imple-
mentations of Sparx using FELICS in the two aforementioned usage scenarios.
The key performance ﬁgures are summarized in Table 6. The balanced results
are achieved using the 1-step implementations of Sparx-64/128 and Sparx-
128/128.
Table 7: Top 10 best implementations in Scenario 1 (encryption key schedule +
encryption and decryption of 128 bytes of data using CBC mode) ranked by the
Figure of Merit (FOM) deﬁned in FELICS. The results for all ciphers are the
current ones from the Triathlon Competition at the moment of submission. The
smaller the FOM, the better the implementation.
Rank Cipher
Block Key Scenario 1
size size FOM
1 Speck 64 128 5.0
2 Chaskey-LTS 128 128 5.0
3 Simon 64 128 6.9
4 RECTANGLE 64 128 7.8
5 LEA 128 128 8.0
6 Sparx 64 128 8.6
7 Sparx 128 128 12.9
8 HIGHT 64 128 14.1
9 AES 128 128 15.3
10 Fantomas 128 128 17.2
Then we compare the performance of Sparx with the current results avail-
able on the Triathlon Competition at the time of submission. 8 As can be seen
in Table 7 the two instances of Sparx perform very well across all platforms
and rank very high in the FOM-based ranking. The forerunners are the NSA
designs Simon and Speck, Chaskey, RECTANGLE and LEA, but, apart from
8 Up to date results are available at https://www.cryptolux.org/index.php/FELICS.
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RECTANGLE, none of them provides provable bounds against diﬀerential and
linear cryptanalysis.
Besides the overall good performance ﬁgures in the two usage scenarios, the
following results are worth mentioning:
– the execution time of Sparx-64/128 on MSP is in the top 3 of the fastest
ciphers in both scenarios thanks to its 16-bit oriented operations;
– the code size of the 1-step rolled implementations of Sparx-64/128 and
Sparx-128/128 on MSP is in the top 5 in both scenarios as well as in the
small code size and RAM table for scenario 2;
– the 1-step rolled implementation of Sparx-64/128 breaks the previous min-
imum RAM consumption record on AVR in scenario 2;
– the execution time of the 2-steps implementation of Sparx-64/128 in sce-
nario 2 is in the top 3 on MSP, in the top 5 on AVR, and in the top 7 on
ARM; it also breaks the previous minimum RAM consumption records on
AVR and MSP.
Given its simple and ﬂexible structure as well as its very good overall rank-
ing in the Triathlon Competition of lightweight block ciphers, the Sparx family
of lightweight ciphers is suitable for applications on a wide range of resource
constrained devices. The absence of look-up tables reduces the memory require-
ments and provides, according to [24], some intrinsic resistance against power
analysis attacks.
5 Replacing Rotations with Linear Layers: the LAX
Construction
In this section we outline an alternative strategy for designing an ARX cipher
with provable bounds against diﬀerential and linear cryptanalysis. It is com-
pletely independent from the Long Trail Strategy outlined in the previous sec-
tions and uses the diﬀerential properties of modular addition to derive proofs of
security.
5.1 Motivation
In his Master thesis [13] Wallén posed the challenge to design a cipher that uses
only addition modulo-2 and GF(2)-aﬃne functions, and that is provably resis-
tant against diﬀerential and linear cryptanalysis [13, Sect. 5]. In this section we
partially solve this challenge by proposing a construction with provable bounds
against single-trail diﬀerential cryptanalysis (DC).
5.2 Theoretical Background
Definition 6 (xdp+). The XOR differential probability (DP) of addition modulo
2n is defined as:
xdp+(α, β → γ) = 2−2n ·#{(x, y) : ((x⊕ α) + (y ⊕ β))⊕ (x+ y) = γ} ,
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where α, β and γ are n-bit XOR differences and x and y are n-bit values.
The XOR linear correlation of addition modulo 2n (xlc+) is deﬁned in a similar
way. Eﬃcient algorithms for the computation of xdp+ and xlc+ have been pro-
posed resp. in [25] and [26,27,28]. These results also reveal the following property.
The magnitude of both xdp+ and |xlc+| is inversely proportional to the number
of bit positions at which the input/output diﬀerences (resp. masks) diﬀer. For
xdp+, this fact is formally stated in the form of the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (Bound on xdp+). The differential probability xdp+ is upper-
bounded by 2−k, where k is the number of bit positions, excluding the MSB, at
which the bits of the differences are not equal:
xdp+(α, β → γ) ≤ 2−k : k = #{i : ¬(α[i] = β[i] = γ[i]), 0 ≤ i ≤ w − 2}
Proof. Follows from [25, Alg. 2, Sect. 4].
A similar proposition also holds for |xlc+| (see e.g. [10]). Proposition 1 provides
the basis of the design strategy described in the following section.
5.3 The LAX Construction
LAX is a block cipher construction with 2n-bit block and n-bit words. We
investigate three instances of LAX designated by the block size: LAX-16, LAX-
32 and LAX-64. A brief description of the round function of LAX-2n, shown in
Fig. 10 (left), is given below.
xL xR
LL
yL yR
αi−2 βi−2
γi−2
LL
αi−1 βi−1
γi−1
LL
αi βi
γi
LL
Fig. 10: Left: the round function of LAX; Right: three round diﬀerential of
LAX.
Let L be an n × n binary matrix that is (a) invertible and (b) has branch
number d > 2. With ℓ(x) is denoted the multiplication of the n-bit vector x
by the matrix L: ℓ(x) = Lx. Note that due to condition (b) it follows that
∀x 6= 0 : h(x) + h(ℓ(x)) ≥ d, where h(x) is the Hamming weight of x.
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The round function A(·) of LAX-2n maps a pair of n-bit words (xL, xR) to
a pair of n-bit words (yL, yR) as follows (see Fig. 10 (left)):
(yL, yR) = A(xL, xR) = (ℓ(xR), ℓ(xL ⊞ xR)) .
The matrix L is chosen as the non-identity part of the generator matrix G
of a systematic [2n, n, d] linear code over GF(2) such that G = [I L]. More
speciﬁcally, the matrices L for LAX-16, LAX-32 and LAX-64 are derived from
the following codes respectively: [16, 8, 5], [32, 16, 8] and [64, 32, 10]. Note that
the matrix of LAX-32 is the same as the one used in block cipher ARIA [29].
5.4 Bounds on the Differential Probability of LAX
Lemma 1. For all differences α 6= 0, the differential (α, α→ α) is impossible.
Proof. Let xdp+(α, β → γ) 6= 0 for some diﬀerences α, β and γ. The statement of
the lemma follows from the following two properties of xdp+ [25]. First, it must
hold that α[0]⊕β[0]⊕γ[0] = 0. Second, if α[i] = β[i] = γ[i] for some 0 ≤ i ≤ n−2,
then it must hold that α[i + 1] ⊕ β[i + 1] ⊕ γ[i + 1] = α[i]. Since we want that
α = β = γ, from the ﬁrst property it follows that α[0] = β[0] = γ[0] = 0. Given
that, due to the second property it follows that α[i] = β[i] = γ[i] = 0, ∀i ≥ 1.
Therefore the only value of α for which xdp+(α, β → γ) 6= 0 and α = β = γ is
α = 0. ⊓⊔
Theorem 2 (Differential bound on 3 rounds of LAX-2n). The maximum
differential probability of any trail on 3 rounds of LAX-2n is 2−(d−2), where d
is the branch number of the matrix L.
Proof. Let (αi−1, βi−1, γi−1), (αi, βi, γi) and (αi+1, βi+1, γi+1) be the input/out-
put diﬀerences of the addition operations in three consecutive rounds of LAX-
2n and let pk = xdp
+(αk, βk → γk) for k ∈ {i − 1, i, i + 1} (see Fig. 10
(right)). We have to show that pi−1pipi+1 ≤ 2
−(d−2) or, equivalently, that
log2 pi−1+log2 pi+log2 pi+1 ≤ −(d−2). Denote with h(x) the Hamming weight
of the word x and with h∗(x) the Hamming weight of x, excluding the MSB.
Note that h∗(x) ≤ h(x)− 1. We consider two cases:
Case 1: βi−1 6= γi−1. By Proposition 1 we have that log2 pi−1 ≤ −h
∗(βi−1 ⊕
γi−1) and log2 pi ≤ −h
∗(αi ⊕ βi). Since βi = ℓ(γi−1) and αi = ℓ(βi−1) (see
Fig. 10 (right)) and using the linearity of ℓ(·) we have that −h∗(αi ⊕ βi) =
−h∗(ℓ(βi−1 ⊕ γi−1)). As βi−1 6= γi−1 it follows that h
∗(βi−1 ⊕ γi−1) 6= 0 and
h∗(ℓ(βi−1 ⊕ γi−1)) 6= 0. Thus we derive:
log2 pi−1 + log2 pi ≤ −h
∗(βi−1 ⊕ γi−1)− h
∗(ℓ(βi−1 ⊕ γi−1)) .
From the properties of L it follows that −h(βi−1⊕γi−1)−h(ℓ(βi−1⊕γi−1)) ≤ −d
and so −h∗(βi−1 ⊕ γi−1)− h
∗(ℓ(βi−1 ⊕ γi−1)) ≤ −(d− 2). Therefore:
log2 pi−1 + log2 pi ≤ −(d− 2) .
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Case 2: βi−1 = γi−1 6= 0. In this case αi = βi = ℓ(βi−1) = ℓ(γi−1). Due to
Lemma 1 it follows that γi 6= βi. Therefore we can apply the argument from
Case 1 on rounds i and i + 1 to derive the statement of the theorem in this
case. ⊓⊔
5.5 Experimental Results
We have implemented the search algorithm proposed in [10] in order to ﬁnd the
probabilities of the best diﬀerential trails in LAX-16 and LAX-32. In Table 8,
we compare the results to the theoretical bounds computed using Theorem 2.
Table 8: Best diﬀerential probabilities and best absolute linear correlations (log2
scale) for up to 12 rounds of LAX.
# Rounds 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
LAX-16 pbest +0 −2 −4 −7 −8 −11 −13 −16 −18 −20 −23 −25
cbest +0 +0 −1 −2 −3 −5 −5 −7 −8 −9 −10 −11
pbound −3 −6 −9 −12
LAX-32 pbest +0 −2 −6 −9 −11 −16 −18 −20 −24 −28 −29 −34
cbest +0 +0 +0 −4 −4 −8 −8 −8 −8 −12 −12 −16
pbound −6 −12 −18 −24
Clearly the bound from Theorem 2 does not hold for the linear case. The
problem is the “three-forked branch” in the LAX round function that acts as
an XOR when the inputs are linear masks rather than diﬀerences. Thus, LAX
only provides diﬀerential bounds and the full solution to the Wallén challenge
still remains an open problem.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we presented, for the ﬁrst time, a general strategy for designing
ARX primitives with provable bounds against diﬀerential (DC) and linear crypt-
analysis (LC) – a long standing open problem in the area of ARX design. The
new strategy, called the Long Trail Strategy (LTS) advocates the use of large
and computationally expensive S-boxes in combination with very light linear
layers (the so-called Long Trail Argument). This makes the LTS to be the exact
opposite of the Wide Trail Strategy (WTS) on which the AES (and many other
SPN ciphers) are based. Moreover, the proposed strategy is not limited to ARX
designs and can easily be applied also to S-box based ciphers.
To illustrate the eﬀectiveness of the LTS we have proposed a new family of
lightweight block ciphers, called SPARX, designed using the new approach. The
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family has three instances depending on the block and key sizes: Sparx-64/128,
Sparx-128/128 and Sparx-128/256. With the help of the Long Trail Argument
we prove resistance against single-trail DC and LC for each of the three instances
of Sparx. In addition, we analyze the new constructions against a wide range of
attacks such as impossible and truncated diﬀerentials, meet-in-the-middle and
integral attacks. Our analysis did not ﬁnd any attack covering at least 70% of
the rounds of any of the three instances. The latter ensures a security margin of
more than 30% for all instances of Sparx.
Beside (provable) security the members of the Sparx family are also very
eﬃcient. We have implemented them in software on three resource constrained
microcontrollers widely used in the Internet of Things (IoT), namely the 8-bit
Atmel ATmega128, the 16-bit TI MSP430, and the 32-bit ARM Cortex-M3.
According to the FELICS open-source benchmarking framework our implemen-
tations of Sparx-64/128 and Sparx-128/128 rank respectively 6 and 7 in the
list of top 10 most software eﬃcient lightweight ciphers. In addition, the execu-
tion time of Sparx-64/128 on MSP is in the top 3 of this list. To the best of our
knowledge, this paper is the ﬁrst to propose a practical ARX design that has
both arguments for provable security and competitive performance.
A secondary contribution of the paper is the proposal of an alternative strat-
egy for ARX design with provable bounds against diﬀerential cryptanalysis. It is
independent of the LTS and uses the diﬀerential properties of modular addition
to derive proofs of security. As an illustration of this approach, the LAX fam-
ily of constructions is described. The provable security of LAX against linear
cryptanalysis is left as an open problem.
7 Acknowledgements
The work of Daniel Dinu and Léo Perrin is supported by the CORE project
ACRYPT (ID C12-15-4009992) funded by the Fonds National de la Recherche,
Luxembourg. The work of Aleksei Udovenko is supported by the Fonds National
de la Recherche, Luxembourg (project reference 9037104). Vesselin Velichkov
is supported by the Internal Research Project CAESAREA of the University
of Luxembourg (reference I2R-DIR-PUL-15CAES). The authors thank Anne
Canteaut for useful discussions regarding error correcting codes.
References
1. Bernstein, D.J.: New Stream Cipher Designs: The eSTREAM Finalists. Springer
Berlin Heidelberg (2008) 84–97
2. Bernstein, D.J.: ChaCha, a variant of Salsa20. In: Workshop Record of SASC.
Volume 8. (2008)
3. Niels, F., Lucks, S., Schneier, B., Whiting, D., Bellare, M., Kohno, T., Callas, J.,
Walker, J.: The Skein hash function family. Submission to NIST (round 3) (2010)
4. Aumasson, J.P., Henzen, L., Meier, W., Phan, R.C.W.: SHA-3 Proposal BLAKE.
https://131002.net/blake/blake.pdf (2010)
29
5. Needham, R.M., Wheeler, D.J.: Tea extensions. Technical report, Cambridge
University, Cambridge, UK (October 1997)
6. Dinu, D.D., Le Corre, Y., Khovratovich, D., Perrin, L., Großschädl, J., Biryukov,
A.: Triathlon of Lightweight Block Ciphers for the Internet of Things. In: NIST
Workshop on Lightweight Cryptography 2015, National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) (2015)
7. Mouha, N., Mennink, B., Herrewege, A., Watanabe, D., Preneel, B., Verbauwhede,
I.: Chaskey: An Eﬃcient MAC Algorithm for 32-bit Microcontrollers. In: Selected
Areas in Cryptography – SAC 2014: 21st International Conference, Montreal, QC,
Canada, August 14-15, 2014, Revised Selected Papers. Springer International Pub-
lishing, Cham (2014) 306–323
8. Beaulieu, R., Shors, D., Smith, J., Treatman-Clark, S., Weeks, B., Wingers, L.:
The SIMON and SPECK Families of Lightweight Block Ciphers. IACR Cryptology
ePrint Archive 2013 (2013) 404
9. Hong, D., Lee, J.K., Kim, D.C., Kwon, D., Ryu, K.H., Lee, D.G.: LEA: A 128-bit
block cipher for fast encryption on common processors. In: Information Security
Applications. Springer (2013) 3–27
10. Biryukov, A., Velichkov, V., Le Corre, Y.: Automatic Search for the Best Trails
in ARX: Application to Block Cipher Speck. In Peyrin, T., ed.: Fast Software
Encryption. Volume 3557 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer Berlin
Heidelberg (2016) To Appear
11. Daemen, J., Rijmen, V.: The Wide Trail Design Strategy. In: Cryptography and
Coding: 8th IMA International Conference Cirencester, UK, December 17–19, 2001
Proceedings. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg (2001) 222–238
12. Daemen, J., Rijmen, V.: The design of Rijndael: AES-the advanced encryption
standard. Springer (2002)
13. Wallén, J.: On the Diﬀerential and Linear Properties of Addition. Master’s thesis,
Helsinki University of Technology (2003)
14. Keliher, L., Sui, J.: Exact maximum expected diﬀerential and linear probability
for 2-round Advanced Encryption Standard. IET Information Security 1(2) (2007)
53–57
15. Nikolić, I.: Tiaoxin-346. Submission to the CAESAR competition (2015)
16. Jean, J., Nikolić, I.: Eﬃcient Design Strategies Based on the AES Round Function.
In Peyrin, T., ed.: Fast Software Encryption. Volume 3557 of Lecture Notes in
Computer Science. Springer Berlin Heidelberg (2016) To Appear
17. Guo, J., Peyrin, T., Poschmann, A., Robshaw, M.: The LED Block Cipher. In:
Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems – CHES 2011: 13th International
Workshop, Nara, Japan, September 28 – October 1, 2011. Proceedings. Springer
Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg (2011) 326–341
18. Knudsen, L., Wagner, D.: Integral Cryptanalysis. In: Fast Software Encryption: 9th
International Workshop, FSE 2002 Leuven, Belgium, February 4–6, 2002 Revised
Papers. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg (2002) 112–127
19. Todo, Y.: Structural Evaluation by Generalized Integral Property. In: Advances
in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2015: 34th Annual International Conference on
the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, Soﬁa, Bulgaria, April
26-30, 2015, Proceedings, Part I. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg
(2015) 287–314
20. Biryukov, A., Khovratovich, D.: Decomposition attack on SASASASAS. Cryptol-
ogy ePrint Archive, Report 2015/646 (2015) http://eprint.iacr.org/.
21. Daemen, J., Peeters, M., Van Assche, G., Rijmen, V.: Nessie proposal: NOEKEON.
In: First Open NESSIE Workshop. (2000) 213–230
30
22. Biryukov, A., Wagner, D.: Slide Attacks. In: Fast Software Encryption: 6th Inter-
national Workshop, FSE’99 Rome, Italy, March 24–26, 1999 Proceedings. Springer
Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg (1999) 245–259
23. Dinu, D.D., Biryukov, A., Großschädl, J., Khovratovich, D., Le Corre, Y., Perrin,
L.a.: FELICS–Fair Evaluation of Lightweight Cryptographic Systems. In: NIST
Workshop on Lightweight Cryptography 2015, National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) (2015)
24. Biryukov, A., Dinu, D., Großschädl, J.: Correlation power analysis of lightweight
block ciphers: From theory to practice. In: International Conference on Applied
Cryptography and Network Security – ACNS 2016. Volume 9696 of Lecture Notes
in Computer Science., Springer (2016) 537–557
25. Lipmaa, H., Moriai, S.: Eﬃcient Algorithms for Computing Diﬀerential Properties
of Addition. In Matsui, M., ed.: FSE. Volume 2355 of LNCS., Springer (2001)
336–350
26. Wallén, J.: Linear Approximations of Addition Modulo 2n. In Johansson, T., ed.:
FSE 2003. Volume 2887 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science., Springer (2003)
261–273
27. Nyberg, K., Wallén, J.: Improved linear distinguishers for SNOW 2.0. In: Fast
Software Encryption, Springer (2006) 144–162
28. Dehnavi, S.M., Rishakani, A.M., Shamsabad, M.R.M.: A More Explicit Formula
for Linear Probabilities of Modular Addition Modulo a Power of Two. Cryptology
ePrint Archive, Report 2015/026 (2015) http://eprint.iacr.org/.
29. Kwon, D., Kim, J., Park, S., Sung, S.H., Sohn, Y., Song, J.H., Yeom, Y., Yoon,
E.J., Lee, S., Lee, J., Chee, S., Han, D., Hong, J.: New Block Cipher: ARIA. In:
Information Security and Cryptology - ICISC 2003: 6th International Conference,
Seoul, Korea, November 27-28, 2003. Revised Papers. Springer Berlin Heidelberg,
Berlin, Heidelberg (2004) 432–445
30. Ferguson, N., Kelsey, J., Lucks, S., Schneier, B., Stay, M., Wagner, D., Whiting,
D.: Improved Cryptanalysis of Rijndael. In: Fast Software Encryption: 7th Interna-
tional Workshop, FSE 2000 New York, NY, USA, April 10–12, 2000 Proceedings.
Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg (2001) 213–230
A Appendix
A.1 Test Vectors for Sparx
Test vectors are shown as 16-bit words in hexadecimal notation.
A.2 Best Attacks Against Sparx
An Integral Distinguisher for 128-bit Blocks .
Consider an instance of Sparx operating on 128-bit blocks. Using Todo’s
division property, we found that if we ﬁx the left-most 32-bit word of the plaintext
and let the other 3 take all possible 296 values, then the output of the two right-
most word at the end of the last S-Box layer of the 5th step are balanced. This
pattern is destroyed by the linear layer of the 5th step.
However, because half of the A function merely undergoes linear transforma-
tions, and because the LSB of modular addition is a linear function, it is possible
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Sparx-64/128
key 0011 2233 4455 6677 8899 aabb ccdd eeff
plaintext 0123 4567 89ab cdef
ciphertext 2bbe f152 01f5 5f98
Sparx-128/128
key 0011 2233 4455 6677 8899 aabb ccdd eeff
plaintext 0123 4567 89ab cdef fedc ba98 7654 3210
ciphertext 1cee 7540 7dbf 23d8 e0ee 1597 f428 52d8
Sparx-128/256
key
0011 2233 4455 6677 8899 aabb ccdd eeff
ffee ddcc bbaa 9988 7766 5544 3322 1100
plaintext 0123 4567 89ab cdef fedc ba98 7654 3210
ciphertext 3328 e637 14c7 6ce6 32d1 5a54 e4b0 c820
to extend this distinguisher by one more round. First, the last operations of A
can be inverted for free because they are linear, as summarized in Figure 11, to
obtain new 16-bit values a, b, ..., h, as deﬁned in the same picture where we also
deﬁne the quantities t, u, v and w.
Consider a structure of size 296 obtained by encrypting 296 plaintexts where
the left-most 32-bit word is ﬁxed and the other take all possible values. We use
z[j] to denote the j-th bit of a 16-bit word z where the ordering is from LSB to
MSB. Let i be the index of the ciphertexts in our structure. Then the following
equation holds with probability 1:
296−1⊕
i=0
(
(ei[0]⊕f i[0])⊕f i[14]⊕(gi[0]⊕hi[0])⊕hi[14]
)
⊕(bi[10]⊕f i[10]) = 0. (1)
Indeed, the sum of these values and the corresponding key bits yields the value
of ui[10] which sums to 0 over the structure, regardless of the key bits. If we look
at wi[10] instead of ui[10], we can derive another equation:
296−1⊕
i=0
(
(ei[0]⊕f i[0])⊕f i[14]⊕(gi[0]⊕hi[0])⊕hi[14]
)
⊕(di[10]⊕hi[10]) = 0. (2)
Equations (1) and (2) hold for any key and for any such structure of 296 cipher-
texts. They can be used to attack both Sparx-128/128 and Sparx-128/256.
Integral Attack Against 22/(24)-round Sparx-128/128(256) .
We use this distinguisher to attack 22-round Sparx-128/128. It is naturally
extended to attack 6 steps (24 rounds) of Sparx-128/256 by guessing keys for
two more rounds. We will use the partial sums technique introduced by Ferguson
et al. in [30]. The idea of the attack is to encrypt several structures of plaintexts
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Fig. 11: Principle of the integral attack against Sparx instances operating on
128 bits. Bold numbers denote bit rotations to the left. The letter B denotes
balanced 16-bit words at the end of the S-Box layer of the ﬁfth step.
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and then by using partial sums to split the key guessing work into two parts and
ﬁnally to ﬁlter out wrong keys. An outline of the attack follows.
1. Encrypt 64 structures of 296 plaintexts such that the left-most word is ﬁxed
inside each structure and the other three take all possible values.
2. For each structure and each word position:
(a) Store all word values which occur an odd number of times in this position
in all ciphertexts from the structure. On average there will be 231 such
values per structure per position.
3. Initialize a hash table indexed by 128-bit blocks.
4. For all 264 possible keys K0,K1:
(a) For each structure, decrypt one round of Speckey on all stored words
for positions 0 and 1 using keys K0 and K1 respectively. Compute the
contribution of decrypted bits to sums from Equations (1) and (2). Such
contributions form a 128-bit string s (two bits per structure).
(b) Add K0||K1 to the hash table with index s.
5. For all 264 possible keys K2,K3:
(a) Decrypt one round of Speckey on all stored words for positions 2 and 3
using keys K2,K3 and compute the contributions similarly to the previ-
ous step. Since XOR of the contributions from left and right halves must
be equal to zero for each structure, the contributions must be equal.
(b) Check if the 128-bit contribution string is in the hash table. If it is there,
get the corresponding key K0||K1 and save K0||K1||K2||K3 as a key
candidate.
6. On average we will obtain 1 key candidate for the last round. Then we can
decrypt the last round and run another attack or we can exploit the key
schedule and reconstruct all round keys.
Step 2 requires 64·296·4 = 2104 simple operations. Complexity of steps 4 and 5
is equal to 264 ·64·2·231 = 2102 Speckey round decryptions. Therefore full attack
complexity can be bounded by 2105 operations. The data complexity is equal to
64 · 296 = 2102. To store the hashtable we need around 264 · (2 · 64 + 64) < 272
memory blocks.
The 24-round attack on Sparx-128/256 is very similar. We encrypt 192
structures and guess keys required to decrypt three Speckey rounds instead
of one. The complexity then is dominated by steps 4 and 5 and is equal to
2 · 2192 · 192 · 2 · 231 < 2233 operations. The data complexity is 192 · 296 < 2104
chosen plaintexts. The memory complexity is around 2192 · (2 · 192+192) < 2202
blocks.
We note that by exploiting the key schedule we can reduce the complexities
by not guessing a repeating key material. However, we did not manage to attack
more rounds.
Integral Attack Against 15-round Sparx-64/128 .
If we encrypt a structure built by setting the left side to a constant and
letting the right side take all possible values using Sparx-64/128 then, with
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probability 1, the right side after 3 steps (minus the last linear layer) must take
all 232 possible values. Using multi-set terminology, a permutation on the right
side of the input becomes a permutation on the right side of the output. We can
use this property as a distinguisher for 12 rounds. Furthermore, it turns out that
the division property does not yield any stronger result in this case.
As for the attacks against 128-bit block variants, we can append one round
after the end of the 4th step and derive a linear equation linking the LSB of the
modular addition on the right with 2 other bits from the right hand side and
1-bit from the left hand side. The sum of these bits over the ciphertexts in a
structure must be equal to 0.
We append two rounds at the end of this distinguisher to attack 5 steps of
this block cipher. To do this, we repeat the following procedure several times.
1. Encrypt a structure of 232 plaintexts.
2. Invert the last linear linear.
3. For all 64-bit key kL, partially decrypt 2 rounds for the left-hand side and
store kL in a list indexed by the xor of the 3 interesting bits from this side.
4. For all 64-bit key kR, partially decrypt 2 rounds for the right-hand side and
store kR in list indexed by the unique interesting bit from this side.
Each time we repeat this procedure, we re-distribute the key guesses in list
indexed by the concatenation of the indices in the successive structures. For
example, if kR is in list 1 for the ﬁrst structure and list 0 for the second one, we
place it in a general list with index 01 = 1. If it is placed in list 1 by the third
structure, we move it to the general list 101 = 5, and so on.
If we repeat this procedure u times, we obtain 2128−u key candidates of
128 bits from which we deduce full key candidates that are tested with trial
encryptions. We thus have a time/data tradeoﬀ: with only one structure, we can
only recover 1 bit from the key. Conversely, with all 128 structures, we recover
the full key.
The treatment of each structure requires 232+64 operations and the storage
of 232 ciphertexts. At all times, we must also store all 264 candidates for both
kL and kR. The complexity of the ﬁnal brute-force is 2
128−u. If u ≥ 32, the
bottle-neck in terms of time is the treatment of all u structures.
In the end, we attack 5 steps (i.e. 15 rounds) of Sparx-64/128 using about
264 blocks of memory, 232 × u chosen plaintexts and u296 = 2128−u operations.
In particular, if we use 32 structure, we can break this cipher in time 2101 using
237 chosen plaintexts.
A.3 Algorithms for Bounding MEDCP and MELCC of an SPN
Cipher Using a Long Trail Strategy
Decomposing a truncated trail into long trails Here we sketch an algo-
rithm for ﬁnding an optimal decomposition of a given truncated trail into long
trails.
First, note that the trail can be represented as a graph, where nodes are
active S-Boxes and an edge corresponds to a possible connection of two S-Boxes
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in a long trail. Moreover, this graph is a forest. Indeed, an S-Box can’t receive
two edges from the previous round, because it contradicts a deﬁnition of long
trail - there must be a single diﬀerence coming in. For each tree in the forest,
we choose the root to be the S-Box from the earliest round, which is determined
uniquely by the same reason. Then, for any node its children may be only in the
next round.
The goal then is to cover all nodes with disjoint vertical paths, such that
the product of the paths’ probabilities is minimal. By the path probability we
understand the respective long trail’s probability. The simplest (and the worst)
solution is to choose paths consisting of single nodes. Note that this solution al-
ready gives some upper bound and by ﬁnding a better decomposition we improve
this bound.
We propose an algorithm based on recursive dynamic programming approach.
For each node, we recursively solve the sub-problem for the subtree rooted at
that node. But we need to compute some additional information besides the best
decomposition of the subtree. Consider the optimal decomposition of the whole
forest into such paths and consider the long trail which goes through the current
subtree’s root. Clearly, if we ﬁx this long trail, the rest of the subtree becomes
completely independent and has to be decomposed optimally. Therefore, from
the subtree we need to know only the probability of this decomposition and the
length of the long trail’s part in the subtree. We don’t know the optimal length
beforehand, therefore we store the best probabilities for all possible lengths.
Another view on this is that we group all possible subtree decompositions by
length of the long trail which goes through the subtree root and for each such
length we greedily choose the minimum probability. Then, when we obtain such
tables for all children of some node, we can easily compute the table for the node
itself - we check all possible ways to choose a child of the node and the length
of the long trail which goes through the child and we try to join the current
node to that long trail. Then the corresponding probability is the product of the
best probabilities of the other children with the probability corresponding to the
children’s long trail and the probability stored in the children’s table respectively
for that length.
Once a table for a node is computed, there will be only one pass through it -
when we will compute the table for its parent. Therefore, the node’s contribution
to the complexity is at most O(r), where r is the height of its subtree and is
bounded by the number of rounds. The total complexity of the algorithm then
is at most O(wr2), where wr corresponds to the total number of S-Boxes in the
cipher.
Efficient algorithm for special linear layers. In Section 3.4 we explained
an algorithm to bound MEDCP and MELCC of an SPN-based cipher, in which
the linear layer has a particular property.
The pseudo-code is given in Algorithm 5. It is possible to modify the al-
gorithm such that it returns the best truncated trail too. To do this we can
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maintain a mapping of trails to their “parent” trail so that when we obtain the
ﬁnal probability, we can reconstruct the full trail step by step from the end.
A.4 Choosing the linear layer for Sparx-128/128 and
Sparx-128/256
In this Appendix we describe in details the procedure that we followed when
designing the linear layers for 128-bit Sparx instances. The basic approach is to
exhaustively check all possible linear layers for which we could prove MEDCP
and MELCC bounds.
Recall that the constraint on matrices from Section 3.4 is that there must be
at most one 1 in each column and in each row (because we run the algorithm
on the matrix transpose as well). For simplicity and implementation reasons, we
now consider matrices with exactly one 1 in each row and column. Such matrices
also foster the appearance of long trails.
The matrices we look at correspond to permutations of 4 words with some
zeroes possibly replaced by special elements which we denote by L. Though
there may be several elements L in the matrix, it is not necessary that all the
corresponding small linear functions are equal. The total number of such matrices
is 4! · 212 = 98304.
First, we observe that for any matrixM and for any word permutation matrix
P , the matrices M and P ×M ×P−1 are equivalent to reordering arx-boxes in
the whole cipher. Thus, we keep only one representative from each such class.
Next, we drop the matrices which do not provide full diﬀusion. We applied two
diﬀerent techniques to check this and the results matched. The ﬁrst way is to
use symbolic computation. The second one is based on replacing each L with
some random small matrix (e.g. 5× 5) and evaluating the matrix several times
on all inputs with one active word. We stop if the number of steps reached the
limit of 20 or if the full diﬀusion is reached earlier. After this ﬁltering step we
had only 3282 matrices left.
For all reasonable numbers of steps and rounds in a step, we ran our algo-
rithm to obtain bounds on MELCC and MEDCP. We also searched for integral
characteristics using the division property in order to both ensure good diﬀusion
and to estimate resilience against this type of attack.
Note that the integral characteristic search does not depend on the number
of rounds per step because we analyze only the high-level structure. However,
the MELCC and MEDCP bounds do depend on this value, so we have to make
the choice. Two rounds per step completely contradict our analysis simpliﬁcation
about randomness of the ARX box. Whereas for ﬁve or more rounds per step
we have to take fewer steps and the cipher may become susceptible to structural
attacks (for example [20]). Therefore, we consider only the cases ra = 3 and
ra = 4.
Also note that some matrices have many “L”, making them both hard to
analyse and to implement. To prevent this issue, we considered diﬀerent cases
based on the number of words which are copied from the input to the output
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Algorithm 5 Finding the best bound on the DP of a truncated trail (for LC
the matrix should be transposed).
Inputs number of steps r; w × w matrix M over {0, 1, L}, with at most one 1
at each column; non-decreasing bounds on DP (or LC) (P [1], . . . , P [r])
Output probability of the best truncated trail best_prob
Let S0 ← {0, 1}
w \ {0w}, pr0[s] = 1.0 for all s ∈ S0 ⊲ 0 - inactive, 1 - lt of
length 1.
for all i ∈ [0, r − 1] do
Let Si+1 = {}
for all s ∈ Si do
for all (s′, p′) ∈ Extensions(s, pri[s]) do
add s′ to set Si+1
pri+1[s
′]← max(pri+1[s
′], p′)
end for
end for
end for
return max(prr[s] for s ∈ Sr)
function Extensions(s, p)
Let out_states← []
for all cancel ∈ {false, true}w do
Let s′ ← 0w, p′ ← p
for all o ∈ [0, w − 1] do
Let mask ← (if si > 0 then Mo,i else 0 for i ∈ [0, w − 1])
if mask contains single 1 then
i← index of 1 in mask
s′[o]← s[i] + 1
p′ ← p′ + P [s[i] + 1]− P [s[i]] ⊲ Extending an lt
else if mask contains single L then
s′[o]← 1 ⊲ An lt is broken by the linear layer
p′ ← p′ + P [1]
else if mask contains at least two nonzero elements then
if cancel[o] then
s′[o]← 0 ⊲ Diﬀerences cancelled
else
s′[o]← 1
p′ ← p′ + P [1] ⊲ Diﬀerences not cancelled
end if
end if
end for
if s′ 6= 0w then
append (s′, p′) to out_states
end if
end for
return out_states
end function
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without change. More copies results in easier and more eﬃcient implementation,
easier identiﬁcation of long trails but weaker diﬀusion.
Finally, we selected the best matrices according to one of the following two
criteria.
1. Minimizing the diﬀerential/linear trail probability. We compute the number
of steps when the trail probability bound derived by the algorithm is less
than 2−128 for diﬀerential trails and less than 2−64 for linear.
2. Minimizing the number of steps of the integral characteristic found with
division property.
The results are given in Table 9 and Table 10, where+S denotes an additional
arx-box layer.
Table 9: The best linear layers for ra = 3.
#words
copied
optim. for best int.
char.
min. rounds
(diﬀ./linear)
matrix
0
diﬀ./linear 4 7/7 [10L0,010L,L001,0L10]
diﬀusion 2+S 8/8 [10L0,01L0,LLL1,001L]
1
diﬀ./linear 4+S 7/7 [001L,0001,10L0,L10L]
diﬀusion 3+S 7/8 [001L,0001,100L,L1LL]
2
diﬀ./linear 7+S 6/6 [00L1,1000,L100,0010] (a)
diﬀusion 3+S 8/11 [0010,0001,1LLL,L1LL]
tradeoﬀ 4+S 7/7 [0001,1L0L,0100,0L1L] (b)
3
diﬀ./linear 9+S 7/7 [LL01,1000,0100,0010]
diﬀusion 7+S 8/9 [LLL1,1000,0100,0010]
The results show that heavier matrices (without words copied) lead to better
diﬀusion, as expected, whereas for linear/diﬀerential security the matrices with
2 words copied give best results for both ra = 3 and ra = 4. Though heavy
matrices can give a good compromise between these two criteria, they are hard
to implement, to study and, in particular it is hard to implement their inverses.
Thus, we decided to stick to light matrices.
The most interesting matrices are marked by (a),(b),(c),(d) and the struc-
tures of the corresponding layers are depicted in Fig. 12. For ra = 3 the matrix
with the best diﬀerential/linear security, (a), yields an integral characteristic
covering almost 8 steps. Another interesting matrix, (b), requires 7 steps which
corresponds to 21 rounds. For ra = 4, we can achieve diﬀerential/linear security
in 5 steps (20 rounds) using matrix (c): the MEDCP for 20 rounds is bounded
by 2−138 and the MELCC by 2−68. Notably, this matrix is a Feistel round
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Table 10: The best linear layers for ra = 4.
#words
copied
optim. for best int.
char.
min. rounds
(diﬀ./linear)
matrix
0
diﬀ./linear 3 5/5 [L010,00L1,1L0L,01L0]
diﬀusion 2+S 6/5 [10L0,01L0,LLL1,001L]
1 both 3+S 5/5 [10LL,01L0,LLL1,0010]
2
diﬀ./linear 4+S 5/5 [0010,0001,10LL,01LL] (c)
diﬀusion 3+S 5/6 [0010,0001,1LLL,L1LL] (d)
3 both 7+S 5/6 [LLL1,1000,0100,0010]
operating on 32 bit words. Matrix (d) is similar but it adds additional mixing
between the two left branches, which improves diﬀusion but slightly weakens
diﬀerential/linear security.
A cipher built with ra = 4 and matrix (c) provides a good compromise be-
tween diﬀerential/linear security, diﬀusion, strength of the ARX-box, simplicity
and easiness/eﬃciency of implementation. It also generalizes elegantly the linear
layer of Sparx-64/128. We thus settle for this Feistel-like function. For conve-
nience, we decided to use its mirrored version.
L L
(a)
L
L
L
L
(b)
L
(c)
L
L
(d)
Fig. 12: Possible linear layers.
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